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COVID-19	and	rising	food	prices	in	India
With	India	in	lockdown	and	economic	activity	virtually	brought	to	a	standstill,	what	will	the	effect	of	such	radical	state
interventions	be	on	food	prices?	Here	Vatsalya	Srivastava	(O.P	Jindal	Global	University)	and	Apurva	Harsh
(Google,	India)	explain	why	we	shouldn’t	look	to	blame	the	shopkeeper,	what	policy	options	are	available	to	the
government	in	the	face	of	rising	food	prices,	and	the	best	way	forward	for	a	large	and	mostly	poor	country	like	India.
A	visit	to	the	store	in	my	neighbourhood,	58	kilometres	from	the	heart	of	New	Delhi,	revealed	that	the	price	of
peanuts	has	doubled,	in	last	10	days!	As	I	was	coming	to	terms	with	this,	I	overheard	a	conversation	between
another	customer	and	the	shopkeeper.	This	customer,	more	vocal	in	his	dismay	at	the	rise	in	price	was	quick	to
accuse	the	shopkeeper	of	making	the	most	of	the	pandemic.	The	shopkeeper,	calm	but	firm,	pushed	back.	Just	like
the	police	and	doctors,	he	too	is	providing	an	essential	service	in	the	midst	of	a	lockdown	has	completely	upended
the	distribution	chain	that	brings	goods	to	shops	like	his,	he	said.	He	now	had	access	to	just	one	wholesaler	–	15
kilometres	away	and	on	the	other	side	of	the	Delhi	border.	Of	all	his	acquaintances,	only	one	had	a	pass	for
movement	during	the	lockdown.	This	person	was	now	ferrying	goods	to	shops	in	his	personal	car	at	great	personal
risk,	cost,	and	inconvenience.	Therefore,	it	was	a	minor	luxury	that	peanuts	were	even	available	in	the	shop!
The	shopper	in	question	paid	up	and	left.	But	the	prices	of	commodities	will	continue	to	go	up	in	the	estimated	15
million	kirana	(small	grocery)	stores	across	India,	and	so	will	the	resentment	against	it.	The	explanation	of	first
resort	for	rising	costs	is	often	the	greed	of	the	shopkeeper.	Here,	we	examine	this	simplistic	claim,	the	policy
options	available	to	the	government	in	the	face	of	rising	prices,	and	the	best	way	forward	for	a	large	and	mostly
poor	country	like	India.
A	basic	tenet	of	economic	theory	is	that	market	price	is	one	where	demand	equals	supply.	There	are	two	aspects	to
supply,	as	indeed	to	demand		–	ability	and	willingness.	Suppliers	must	have	both	the	ability	and	the	willingness	to
supply	a	certain	amount	of	a	good	at	the	prevailing	or	determined	price.	Ability	depends	on	the	availability	or	stock
of	the	good,	while	willingness	is	a	function	of	the	costs	of	supplying	and	the	expected	returns.	A	deficit	of	either
ability	or	willingness	would	lead	to	the	supply	being	curtailed	and/or	the	price	rising.
In	the	current	scenario,	as	aptly	expressed	by	the	shopkeeper,	even	if	sufficient	stocks	of	a	good	are	available	there
is	a	high	cost	to	selling:	“you	are	afraid	of	the	encounter	with	3-4	people,	we	come	into	contact	with	100	everyday	…
my	personal	car	that	has	to	be	used	to	ferry	things	back	and	forth	has	been	worn	down	in	two	weeks”.	The
shopkeeper	will	factor	these	additional	costs	into	the	price	at	which	he	is	willing	to	sell.	From	a	buyer’s	perspective,
this	will	look	like	price	gouging	in	the	face	of	a	crisis.	The	seller,	on	the	other	hand,	would	feel	that	the	higher	price
more	accurately	reflects	the	actual	cost	of	making	a	good	available.
This	simple	analysis	is	not	limited	to	the	case	of	the	local	shopkeeper	but	extends	to	many	other	businesses.	For
instance,	truckers	may	be	willing	to	incur	the	cost	of	them	becoming	infected	and	not	be	able	to	return	to	their
village	only	for	a	higher	than	regular	renumeration.	This	is	not	to	say	that	there	will	not	be	businesses	that	are	run
solely	as	racketeering	and	profiteering	enterprises.	But	a	price	rise	is	insufficient	evidence	for	market	manipulation.
It	is	important	that	we	make	this	distinction,	particularly	when	evaluating	the	response	of	local	businesses,	which
seem	to	act	fairly	under	normal	circumstances.
”No	famine	has	ever	taken	place	in	the	history	of	the	world	in	a	functioning	democracy”
Democratic	governments	can	be	held	accountable	by	citizens	and	so	have	to	respond	to	complaints	of	wide-spread
distress	of	any	kind.	The	incentives	innate	to	a	democracy	that	underlie	Amartya	Sen’s	assertion	will	ensure	that	the
government	will	have	to	act	against	rising	prices,	even	if	they	are	not	driven	by	an	intention	to	gouge	customers.
There	are	two	distinct	policy	options	that	are	considered	to	be	available	to	a	government	in	responding	to	such
situations.	It	can	either	take	over	the	distribution	and	allocation	responsibilities	from	the	market	or	it	can	enact	price
ceilings,	at	least	for	essential	goods.
South Asia @ LSE: COVID-19 and rising food prices in India Page 1 of 2
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-04-07
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2020/04/07/covid-19-and-rising-food-prices-in-india/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/
The	government	taking	over	the	distribution	and	allocation	of	goods	would	impose	a	massive	cost	and	exertion	on
an	already	stretched	government	machinery.	Even	then,	it	is	unlikely	that	government	distribution	systems	can
supplant	the	existing	networks	that	extend	to	every	small	street	in	every	small	village,	and	certainly	not	at	short
notice.	More	than	a	century	ago,	John	Stuart	Mill	pointed	out	that	“though	the	Government	can	do	more	than	any
other	merchant,	it	cannot	nearly	do	so	much	as	all	the	merchants”.	This	was	codified	in	the	famine	codes	of	the
British	government	India,	advising	that	“much	caution	will	be	required	in	every	case	lest	interference	should
aggravate	the	evil	which	it	is	designed	to	avert	and	have	the	effect	of	preventing	traders	from	entering	the	market
while	it	is	being	operated	upon	by	the	Government”.	We	would	do	well	to	heed	this	advice.
Price	ceiling	does	seem	to	be	less	invasive	and	onerous	to	implement.	Little	wonder	then	that	it	has	been	the
government’s	preferred	policy	option	in	the	past,	including	in	the	early	days	of	the	present	crisis.	But	this	isn’t	a	risk-
free,	cost-free	alternative	either.	The	cost	of	monitoring	and	enforcement	would	be	significant.	Many	of	us	would
have	seen	recent	videos	of	government	officials	raiding	and	sealing	kirana	shops	that	were	found	charging	more
than	the	government	stipulated	prices.	Is	it	really	wise	to	criminalize	shopkeepers	and	shut	down	shops	at	this
time?	Would	that	not	further	constrict	supply?
Even	if	somehow	shopkeepers	across	the	country	could	be	made	to	adhere	to	price	controls,	it	might	lead	many	to
shutter	their	business	as	the	prices	would	not	compensate	them	for	the	costs	they	incur.	Or	worse,	the	policy	meant
to	protect	consumers	interests	will	end	up	harming	them	as	a	black	market	will	come	up,	sucking	away	goods	and
materials	from	the	regulated	shops	that	will	remain	functional.	India’s	relationship	with	price	controls	is	long	and	not
necessarily	a	pleasant	one.	
The	Way	Forward	
This	still	leaves	the	problem	of	many	millions	not	being	able	to	access	essential	supplies,	a	glaring	gap	that	cannot
go	unplugged.	Our	recommendation	is	that,	at	this	point	in	time,	the	government	must	focus	solely	on	the	poorest,
the	people	who	are	most	likely	to	be	completely	priced	out	of	the	market.	This	would	entail	a	warlike	effort	to	ensure
the	continuity	and	accessibility	of	the	Public	Distribution	System	(PDS).	Stranded	or	out	of	work	workers	housed	in
camps	or	shelters	should	be	another	priority.	Many	states	have	made	strides	in	this	regard	but	have	complained	of
inadequate	financial	support	from	the	Centre.	Similarly,	the	cash	allowances	earmarked	for	the	poor	should	reach
them	without	delay	or	red	tape.	In	fact,	the	government	must	also	consider	topping	up	these	cash	transfers.
These	are	still	early	days	in	India’s	fight	against	Covid-19.	The	state	machinery	is	already	engaged	on	multiple
fronts	–	enforcing	law	and	order,	ensuring	essential	services,	preventing	and	treating	Covid-19,	housing	migrant
workers,	to	name	a	few.	The	government	needs	to	pick	its	battles	carefully.	It	must	decide	which	fires	it	needs	to
fight	immediately,	and	which	will	burn	themselves	out	in	the	course	of	time.	There	will	never	be	enough	resources	to
solve	all	the	problems	that	come	with	a	crisis	of	this	magnitude.
Policing	the	price	of	peanuts	and	similar	goods	should	not	consume	precious	government	resources.	The	middle
class	will	manage.	They	might	feel	the	pinch,	but	they	will	manage.	The	middle-class	shopper-shopkeeper
transactions	are	often	long-term	in	nature,	which	do	not	begin	and	end	with	the	pandemic.	The	shop	downstairs	will
not	close	when	the	epidemic	ends;	the	spectre	of	the	future	will	limit	excessive	pricing	by	the	shopkeeper.	The
limited	arrows	in	the	quiver	of	a	government	strapped	for	resources	should	be	targeted	at	places	where	they	are
needed	most.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Photo	credit:	Peanut.	Credit:	@isaidzib,	Unsplash.	
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